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Abstract
Contact tracing is an important control strategy for containing Ebola epidemics. From a
theoretical perspective, explicitly incorporating contact tracing with disease dynamics presents
challenges, and population level effects of contact tracing are difficult to determine. In this
work, we formulate and analyze a mechanistic SEIR type outbreak model which considers the
key features of contact tracing, and we characterize the impact of contact tracing on the effective
reproduction number, Re, of Ebola. In particular, we determine how relevant epidemiological
properties such as incubation period, infectious period and case reporting, along with varying
monitoring protocols, affect the efficacy of contact tracing. In the special cases of either perfect
monitoring of traced cases or perfect reporting of all cases, we derive simple formulae for the
critical proportion of contacts that need to be traced in order to bring the effective reproduction
number Re below one. Also, in either case, we show that Re can be expressed completely in
terms of observable reported case/tracing quantities, namely Re = k (1− q)
q
+km where k is the
number of secondary traced infected contacts per primary untraced reported case, km is the
number of secondary traced infected contacts per primary traced reported case and (1− q)/q is
the odds that a reported case is not a traced contact. These formulae quantify contact tracing
as both an intervention strategy that impacts disease spread and a probe into the current
epidemic status at the population level. Data from the West Africa Ebola outbreak is utilized
to form real-time estimates of Re, and inform our projections of the impact of contact tracing,
and other control measures, on the epidemic trajectory.
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1. Introduction
Contact tracing has recently gained public attention because of its importance as a control
strategy in the 2014-2015 Ebola outbreaks. Contact tracing is a potentially powerful disease
control strategy in which the close contacts of reported/isolated cases are traced and monitored
so that if they become symptomatic they can be efficiently isolated and, in turn, cause reduced
transmissions. There are numerous studies about contact tracing (also known as active case
finding) over the past two decades. However, from a theoretical point of view, explicit model-
ing of the contact tracing process has been challenging due to the complexities in reconciling
forward dynamics of an epidemic with the action of tracers working through a transmission
chain, along with accounting for particular disease characteristics and public health capabili-
ties. Thus, formulation of mechanistic models of contact tracing that are analytically tractable
and epidemiologically relevant is an important problem in epidemiology.
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Because Ebola is typically transmitted through direct contact with bodily fluids of a symp-
tomatic individual and the incubation period is relatively long (average around 11 days), con-
tacts that have been exposed to Ebola virus can be identified, monitored, and, when symp-
tomatic, be isolated to limit spread [36, 21]. Previous outbreaks have been rapidly controlled
with contact tracing and isolation, along with limiting hospital and funeral transmission [16].
However, the failure of initial containment and the subsequent unprecedented scale of the West
Africa Ebola outbreak in 2014-2015 have challenged public health authorities to employ effective
control measures. As of June 2015, there have been over 27,000 reported cases in the outbreak,
however the incidence has decreased markedly over the past six months due to enhanced con-
trol efforts [37]. Therefore it is vital to evaluate how different interventions, such as contact
tracing, have affected the epidemic and can bring the outbreak to an end. Direct measurement
of the impact of contact tracing on an outbreak has recently been considered in relation to
tuberculosis [22], but a general modeling framework for measuring the population-level effect
of contact tracing with epidemic data is needed for Ebola and other emerging pathogens.
Previous works about contact tracing have used a range of modeling methods from individual
based models on specific networks to compartmental ordinary differential equations at the
population level. While networks are a natural setting for contact tracing [25], their connection
with traditional epidemic compartmental models (through a mean-field approximation) should
be emphasized. Therefore it is desirable to have a modeling framework which can work in
both settings with sufficient detail, mechanism and simplicity. Also, branching process models
[4, 32, 26] have been utilized for explicit contact tracing structure, but lack both the simplicity
and compartmental detail inherent in the differential equation model we formulate in this article.
Many differential equation models have incorporated contact tracing implicitly [35, 31], though
Hyman et al. [23] considered a deterministic model with explicit contact tracing for HIV, a
different setting than an emerging outbreak such as Ebola. Mathematical modeling of Ebola
has been considered by many authors, e.g. [2, 36, 11, 6, 10, 12, 9, 19, 30, 24, 27, 28, 38, 43], and
several of Ebola modeling studies have implicitly incorporated effects of contact tracing (along
with other interventions) [35, 33, 8, 10, 41]. However implicit inclusion of contact tracing fails
to capture the true effect of tracing on the effective reproduction number Re, a key quantity of
interest for epidemiologists.
In this work, we develop a deterministic outbreak model of contact tracing particularly appli-
cable to Ebola epidemics, which explicitly links tracing back to transmissions, and incorporates
disease traits and control together with monitoring protocols. We calculate the effective repro-
duction number, Re, and simulate the model under different control scenarios. In particular,
we perform sensitivity analysis to determine how disease characteristics, variable monitoring
protocols, case reporting and timing of intervention affect the efficacy of contact tracing in
controlling the epidemic. In the special case where either traced contacts are always prevented
from causing further infections (perfect monitoring) or 100% of cases are reported (perfect
reporting), we derive simple formulae for the critical proportion of contacts that need to be
traced in order to bring Re below one.
Furthermore, from the explicit linking of tracing and transmission in our model, we derive novel
formulae directly relating the effective reproduction number Re to contact tracing observables.
Indeed, define k as the average number of secondary infected contacts traced per primary
reported untraced case, and q as the fraction of reported cases which are traced contacts.
Then, in the case of perfect monitoring of traced contacts and the general setting of unknown
underreporting with distinct reported/unreported case infectious periods, we show that the
following formula holds:
Re = k
(
1− q
q
)
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Thus, Re is simply the product of the average number of secondary infected traced contacts
per untraced reported case and the odds that a reported case is not a traced contact. If contact
monitoring is imperfect, but case reporting is assumed to be perfect (100% of cases reported),
then Re can also be expressed simply in terms of contact tracing observables. In this instance,
define km as the average number of secondary infected contacts traced per primary reported
traced case, then:
Re = k
(
1− q
q
)
+ km
Utilizing current data and this formula, we form weekly estimates of Re for the Ebola outbreaks
in Sierra Leone and Guinea, with the main goal of determining the impact of contact tracing
on the epidemics. Taken together, our model and results quantify contact tracing as both a
dynamic intervention strategy impacting disease spread and a probe into the current epidemic
status at the population level.
2. Model and Methods
2.1. Base SEIR model
We begin with an SEIR-type base model consisting of compartments representing susceptible
(S), exposed or incubating (E), and two distinct infectious groups, namely infectious indi-
viduals which will be hospitalized/reported (Ih) and infectious individuals which will not be
hospitalized and unreported (Iu), along with the decoupled compartment of cumulative hospi-
talized/reported cases (H). The following differential equation system models the dynamics of
these populations:
S ′(t) = −βS(t) (Ih(t) + Iu(t))
E ′(t) = βS(t) (Ih(t) + Iu(t))− 1
τ
E(t)
I ′h(t) = ρ
1
τ
E(t)− 1
Th
Ih(t) (1)
I ′u(t) = (1− ρ)
1
τ
E(t)− 1
Tu
Iu(t)
H ′(t) =
1
Th
Ih(t)
The parameter β represents transmission rate for infectious individuals, τ is mean incubation
period, ρ is fraction of hospitalized cases, Th is time from infectiousness (symptom) onset until
hospitalization/isolation and reporting, and Tu is the mean infectious period for an unhospi-
talized case. Note that we consider an infectious case being hospitalized, isolated and reported
as the same, whether or not the individual is treated in a hospital or placed in an isolation
unit. We assume that such a case is reported at the time of hospitalization and neglect any
possibility of hospital transmission. While transmission in a health-care setting poses signifi-
cant risk to workers and visitors during Ebola outbreak, community transmission accounts for
the vast majority of cases. In addition, the main focus of our article is a detailed model of
contact tracing, so we elect to make the model simpler by not including hospital transmission.
For this reason, we also neglect another route of transmission particular to Ebola; post-death
transmission due to improperly handled deceased [43], and leave incorporation of these features
into contact tracing models for future work.
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Figure 1: Base Models: (a) Single infectious compartment model (equation (B1) in Appendix C) with
infectious period T and proportion hospitalized ρ. (b) Multiple infectious compartments model with variables
for those which will be hospitalized, Ih, and unhospitalized, Iu, corresponding infectious periods Th and Tu,
and proportion hospitalized ρ (equation (1)). Informally, in (a), the “hospitalization fate” is determined upon
exit from infectious class, whereas in (b), the “hospitalization fate” is determined upon entry to infectious class.
Note that the model in (a) is a special case of the model in (b).
The distinction between reported cases and unreported cases is important when consider-
ing contact tracing since only reported cases can trigger contact tracing. We explicitly sep-
arate infectious individuals into distinct compartments based on whether they will be re-
ported/hospitalized or unreported. Note that the distinct infectious compartments of system
(1) are in a similar spirit to the model in [29], where the authors divide the infectious class
into individuals who will recover and those who will die. An alternative base model, the classic
SEIR model shown in Figure 1(a), has a single infectious compartment I with mean infectious
period T and, again, fraction of hospitalized cases ρ. It is proved in the Appendix C that such
a model is actually a special case of (1); namely the case where Th = Tu = T and the initial
conditions Ih(0) = ρI(0), Iu(0) = (1 − ρ)I(0). Thus, the multi-infectious compartment model
(1) allows for more generality than the single infectious compartment counterpart, with an ad-
ditional independent parameter. Also, it may be unreasonable to assume that infectious time
periods Th and Tu are equal. Therefore, we utilize the more general base model (1) with multi-
ple infectious compartments, but note that our contact tracing formulation can be incorporated
into either base model.
For model (1), we can consider the time until hospitalization, Th, and the fraction of (untraced)
hospitalized cases, ρ, as parameters which can be together targeted by public health measures
(independent of active contact tracing). The infectious period of unhospitalized cases, Tu, can
be considered a property of the disease. In particular, we can take Tu = ψTd + (1 − ψ)Tr
where ψ is mortality rate (outside of hospital), and Td and Tr are the times until death and
recovery, respectively. Note that instead of explicitly separating infectious cases that will be
unreported into compartments representing death and recovery, we use a single unreported
infectious compartment for simplicity and since Td ≈ Tr (see Appendix C for justification).
The effective reproduction number, Re, for model (1) is given by
Re = βS0 (ρTh + (1− ρ)Tu) = R0
(
ρ
Th
Tu
+ 1− ρ
)
, (2)
where S0 is the initial susceptible population size and R0 = βS0Tu is defined as the basic
reproduction number (without hospitalization of cases). Standard incidence [15] is often utilized
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for Ebola models instead of the mass-action transmission assumed here, in which case R0 is
independent of S0. We remark that replacing the mass-action (per-capita) contact rate βS with
the standard incidence rate β S
N
does not affect the results in this article. Also, the population
size N remains approximately constant over the relevant timescale of the outbreak, thus we
can think of N ≈ S0 as being absorbed into the parameter β.
2.2. Incorporating contact tracing into dynamic models of EVD
We incorporate contact tracing into the SEIR model framework by deriving a mechanistic link
between the retrospective action of contact tracers with forward disease dynamics. First, we
describe the recommended contact tracing process for Ebola. According to the WHO guidelines
for contact tracing in Ebola outbreaks [20], contact tracing consists of three basic elements,
namely, contact identification, contact listing and contact follow-up. The process of contact
identification begins upon an infected individual (alive or dead) being reported and isolated. A
public health officer then conducts an epidemiological investigation to determine the contacts
of the reported case. In the next step (contact listing), a team of contact tracers tracks the
contacts identified from the first step. If they are showing symptoms at the time of tracking,
then the tracers will call for an ambulance team to remove and isolate the individual. Otherwise,
the tracked contacts are informed of their contact status and told to report any symptoms
immediately to a provided telephone number, along with restricting contact with other people.
A surveillance team follows up on the tracked contacts by visiting them regularly during a 21-
day (“approximately” maximum incubation period) window, and calling the ambulance team
if symptoms are present.
In order to model this process, we first make the following assumptions on top of the base
model:
• The hospitalized/reported cases can trigger contact tracing.
• Contacts of a reported case are traced with probability φ and there is a fixed delay δ
between index case reporting and contact tracking. If a traced contact is infectious at
this time, they are immediately removed/isolated; otherwise they follow a monitoring
protocol aimed at early detection and isolation if symptoms develop.
Note that the probability 1−φ accounts for untraced contacts in terms of, both, reported cases
that do not trigger tracing and “missed” contacts from reported cases that trigger contact
tracing, i.e. φ = µξ where µ is fraction of reported cases that trigger contact tracing and ξ is
the average fraction of total contacts from a reported triggering case that are traced. Another
way of expressing φ is the following:
φ =
total # of traced contacts of reported cases
total # of contacts of reported cases
.
We now formulate the contact tracing terms for incorporation into the base model 1. Let
Ce(t), (Ci(t)) be defined as the cumulative number at time t of traced infected individuals who
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are in exposed (infectious) class when first tracked. Then
C ′e(t+ δ) =
1
Th
Ih(t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
rate of reporting
of infectious individuals
∞∫
0
1
Th
e−s/Th︸ ︷︷ ︸
reported case
infectious period
probability density
t∫
t−s︸︷︷︸
integral over
infectious period of
length s
FE(t− r + δ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
probability still
incubating t− r + δ
units after infection
φβS(r) dr︸ ︷︷ ︸
traced transmissions
infected at
time r∈[t−s,t]
ds,
C ′i(t+ δ) =
1
Th
Ih(t)
∞∫
0
1
Th
e−s/Th
t∫
t−s
(1− FE(t− r + δ))φβS(r) dr ds, (3)
where the incubation period cumulative distribution FE can be more general than the assumed
exponential distribution. Since the average infectious period is relatively short, we can assume
S is approximately constant over the infectious period, i.e.
∫∞
0
e−s/Th
Th
∫ t
t−s S(r)drds ≈ ThS(t).
Then the total number of traced transmissions at time t+ δ, C(t+ δ), satisfies
C ′(t+ δ) = C ′e(t+ δ) + C
′
i(t+ δ) ≈ φβS(t)Ih(t)
Motivated by these calculations, we define the following additional four compartments: Eec , (E
i
c)
are exposed individuals who will be traced and incubating (infectious) when tracked; Iec are
infectious individuals who have been traced during incubation stage and put under monitoring
protocol; I ic are infectious individuals who will be traced/removed (since symptomatic when
first tracked). The modeling framework for incorporating tracing is to separate the fraction φ
of reported case contacts that are traced at the moment of transmission, thus establishing an
explicit link between tracing and reported case transmission. Since the action of tracers upon
tracking a contact depends upon whether the traced contact is displaying symptoms, we further
separate transmissions which will be traced into those that will be incubating upon tracking
(Eec ) and those who will be infectious upon tracking (E
i
c). The probability pe of a contact traced
individual being incubating when tracked should generally depend on the index case infectious
period Th, the delay between index case reporting and tracing δ, and the incubation period of
the traced case τ . Indeed pe can be explicitly calculated from (3) as:
pe =
C ′e(t)
C ′e(t) + C
′
i(t)
=
τ
τ + Th
e−δ/τ , (4)
when FE(x) = e
−x/τ (exponentially distributed incubation period) and assuming that S(t) is
constant over an individual case’s infectious period. For the fraction (1−pe) of traced individuals
who are infectious when tracked, their average infectious period (prior to being tracked), Ti, can
be approximated by considering the expected value of the time after symptom onset when a
traced contact is tracked (given that they have progressed past their incubation period upon
tracking), Tˆi:
1
Ti
=
1
T¯
+
1
Tˆi
, where Tˆi =
1
Th
∫ Th
0
[
Th + δ −
(∫ Th+δ
r
xe−(x−r)/τ∫ Th−r+δ
0
e−s/τ ds
dx
)]
dr (5)
with T¯ = ρTh + (1 − ρ)Tu is the (weighted) average infectious period independent of contact
tracing. The above formula (5) is explained in more detail in the Appendix A. We introduce
the following additional assumptions and parameters:
6
1
τ
S
E
Eic I
i
c
1
τ
Ih
Iu 1
Tu
U
1
Th H
Eic
Eec
Tracing Process
Eec
Ce traced
Iec
1
Tm
1
Ti
traced
Ci
peφβIh
(1− pe)φβIh
1
τ(1− φ)βIh + βIu
Figure 2: Mechanistic model of contact tracing : Compartments dividing transmissions into those that are
untraced, E (whom will be unreported Iu or reported Ih and can trigger tracing), and those that are traced
(whom will be tracked when incubating Eec or infectious E
i
c). The tracing process is depicted with the relevant
sequence of events for the traced individuals. Note that higher order tracing events are not illustrated in the
diagram, but are included in the model (6).
• The infectious monitored individuals, Iec , have infectivity βm and mean infectious period
(time from symptom onset until hospitalization) Tm. The parameters Tm and βm depend
on the strictness and efficacy of the monitoring protocols. Note that the infectious indi-
viduals traced during their infectious period, I ic, have infectivity β prior to tracking and
mean infectious period Ti.
• Contact traced infectious individuals, Iec and I ic, trigger contact tracing after being iso-
lated/reported or tracked, which is termed higher order tracing. As with first-order trac-
ing, the fraction φ of their contacts will be traced. In particular, we assume that all
I ic individuals will be tracked, reported and trigger contact tracing, even if they die or
recover before being traced. We introduce the parameters pee (p
i
e) representing the prob-
ability a higher order traced contact will be tracked during their incubation period after
being infected by an Iec (I
i
c) individual.
• The probabilities pee and pie can be calculated similar to pe (4), except using index case
infectious periods Tm and Tˆi respectively. Note that the infectious period for a higher
order tracing infection caused by a I ic individual should be smaller than Ti. But this would
require additional compartments, so we choose to approximate the infectious period as
Ti and “close the system” here.
With all of these assumptions, we arrive at the following model:
S ′ = −βS(Ih + Iu)− βSI ic − βmSIec
E ′ = βSIu + (1− φ) βSIh + (1− φ)βSI ic + (1− φ)βmSIec −
1
τ
E
(Eec )
′ = peφβSIh + pieφβSI
i
c + p
e
eφβmSI
e
c −
1
τ
Eec
(Eic)
′ = (1− pe)φβSIh +
(
1− pie
)
φβI icS + (1− pee)φβmSIec −
1
τ
Eic
I ′h =
ρ
τ
E − 1
Th
Ih (6)
I ′u =
1− ρ
τ
E − 1
Tu
Iu
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(Iec )
′ =
1
τ
Eec −
1
Tm
Iec
(I ic)
′ =
1
τ
Eic −
1
Ti
I ic
The model provides a detailed dynamic description of contact tracing, reconciling the forward
dynamics of the epidemic with the action of tracers working backward along a chain of contact.
The variable and parameter descriptions are listed in Table 1. Despite the number of compart-
ments, several of the parameters are dependent on basic independent parameters. Also, efficacy
of contact tracing is determined by both disease characteristics (through probability pe and Ti as
function of incubation period τ and infectious periods Th, Tu) and monitoring/response efficacy
(through delay δ in calculation of pe, and parameters βm and Tm).
There are limitations and corresponding generalizations of the model for future work. For
example, it is assumed that the incubation and infectious period are exponentially distributed,
and infectivity (transmission) is uniformly distributed throughout the infectious period. These
are inherent assumptions of the ordinary differential equation system, however they may over-
simplify the true epidemiological distributions. Most likely these simplifications underestimate
the impact of contact tracing. Indeed, an exponentially distributed incubation period puts too
much weight in small incubation times, which decreases the value of pe. A more appropriate
distribution, for instance the gamma or Weibull distribution fit to Ebola patient incubation pe-
riod data [36, 11], will result in higher vales of pe, which increases the traced contacts that are
monitored. In addition, assuming a uniform infectivity distribution, i.e. constant transmission
rate, may not be consistent with the fact that viral load will steadily increase after symptom
onset and peak infectivity will occur some time after the infectious period begins. Thus, early
removal of infectious individuals may drastically reduce transmission potential when these in-
dividuals are removed before peak infectivity [42]. Fraser et al. have considered contact tracing
in an infection-age model with general infectivity distribution, however they did not explicitly
link tracing and transmission [21]. Infection-age structured or stage structured models can
include the aforementioned disease features, along with post-death transmission, and incor-
porating tracing into these types of models is left for future work. Despite the limitations,
our ODE formulation offers an analytically tractable, mechanistic model of contact tracing in
disease outbreaks.
3. Results
3.1. Formulas for Re: control and probing properties of tracing
In this section, we consider special cases of the general model (6) in which explicit formulas
for Re are simple and can be expressed completely in terms of contact tracing observables.
First, we consider the special case that pe ≈ 1 and βm = 0, i.e. long incubation period relative
to infectious period, fast tracking and perfect monitoring. Although the formula (4) always
yields pe < 1 for an exponentially distributed infectious period and incubation period, it is
reasonable to assume that pe = 1 (traced individuals are always tracked during their incubation
period) when the incubation period is large relative to infectious period. In other words, we
are assuming that contact tracing is “perfect” in the sense that traced individuals do not cause
any secondary infections (because of effective monitoring and tracking). Later in this section,
we will relax this assumption and consider imperfect monitoring βm > 0 in the case of perfect
reporting (ρ = 1).
The effective reproduction number, Re, in the case of “perfect” tracing (βm = 0, pe = 1)
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Table 1: Model variables and parameters.
Variable/Parameter Description
Variables
S(t) Susceptible individuals
E(t) Exposed (incubating) infected individuals
I(t) Infectious individuals
Eec (t) Exposed individuals who will be traced and incubating when
tracked
Eic(t) Exposed individuals who will be traced and infectious when
tracked
Iec (t) Monitored infectious individuals (previously contact traced
when incubating/not symptomatic).
I ic(t) Infectious individuals who will be traced and removed upon
tracking (since symptomatic when first tracked).
Independent parameters
β Transmission rate (for unmonitored infectious)
τ Mean incubation period
Th Time until hospitalization/reporting independent of contact
tracing
Tu Mean infectious period for unhospitalized case
ρ Fraction of untraced cases that are isolated/reported (and can
trigger tracing)
φ Probability that contact of reported case is traced
δ Time delay between case reporting and contact tracing
βm Transmission rate for monitored infectious (I
e
c ) individuals
Tm Mean infectious period for monitored infectious individuals
(time between symptom onset and isolation)
Dependent parameters
pe Probability of (first order) traced contact being incubating
upon tracking (calculated by formula (4), depends on τ , T , δ)
Ti Mean infectious period (prior to being tracked) for contact
traced infectious (I ic) individuals (calculated by formula (5),
depends on τ , T , δ)
pee Probability of (higher order) traced contact (infected by I
e
c
individual) being incubating upon tracking (calculated by for-
mula (4) using τ , Tm, δ)
pie Probability of (higher order) traced contact (infected by I
i
c
individual) being incubating upon tracking (calculated by for-
mula (4) using τ , Ti, δ)
simplifies to the following (calculation in Appendix B):
Re = R0
(
ρ
Th
Tu
(1− φ) + 1− ρ
)
,
where R0 := βS0Tu is the basic reproduction number, or more precisely the reproductive
number in the absence of contact tracing and hospitalization, ρ is the fraction of (untraced)
cases which are reported and φ is the fraction of reported case transmissions (contacts) which are
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traced. Notice that in the special case of one mean infectious period for all cases, Th = Tu = T ,
the formula for Re reduces to the following:
Re = R0(1− ρφ)
Thus, in this case, the contact tracing effort needed to reduce the effective reproduction number,
Re, below one is:
Re = 1⇔ (ρφ)c = 1−
1
R0 ,
where (ρφ)c is the critical proportion of total cases which need to be traced in order for Re = 1.
This is the product of the fraction of cases which are reported, ρ, and the fraction of contacts
(more precisely, transmissions) of reported cases which are traced, φ. This formula is similar
to what was obtained in special cases of two branching process contact tracing models [32, 26],
but our approach differs from these previous works and is much simpler to derive. Also, note
the similarity with the well-known simple herd immunity vaccination proportion threshold
pc = 1− 1/R0 [17].
The goal now is to directly connectRe with parameters that can be inferred by case and contact
tracing data. Considering the link between contact tracing and transmission, we rewrite the
fraction φ of transmissions from a reported case which will be traced:
φ =
# of traced contacts per reported case
total # of contacts per reported case
:=
`
n
,
where these quantities are defined in a wholly susceptible population, i.e. the total population
size is N = S0. Now the transmission rate β can be written as β = pc, where p is the probability
of transmission per contact and cS0 is the contact rate. Now for a (untraced) reported case
n = cS0Th = βS0Th/p. Define the parameter k as the average number of secondary infected
traced contacts identified per (untraced) reported case. Then k := p` = βS0Th/φ. Note that
the value of the parameter k can be estimated from data and records.
Another important parameter that can be obtained from case and tracing data is the fraction
of reported cases which are traced contacts, denoted by q. We find that q can be expressed as
the following constant in terms of model parameters:
q =
φ
φ+ (1− φ)ρ+ (1− ρ)Tu/Th . (7)
Indeed, one can interpret the denominator (multiplied by ρ) as the probability a case is reported
considering the different potential routes to reporting: traced; untraced, infection caused by
reported case; untraced, infection caused by unreported case. Also, notice in the case of 100%
reporting (ρ = 1), q reduces to q = φ. In addition, from a dynamic perspective, we define the
fraction from the cumulative reported cases over some time window [t− a, t] which are traced
contacts:
q˜a(t) :=
1
Tm
∫ t
t−a Ic(s) ds
1
Tm
∫ t
t−a Ic(s) ds+
1
Th
∫ t
t−a Ih(s) ds
.
In the Appendix B, it is proved that q˜a(t) ≈ q for sufficiently large t, small a; and the
convergence is quite rapid as illustrated in Figure 3(b) for the case a = 7 days.
Combining the formula (7) and k = βS0Thφ, we find the following formula for the effective
reproduction number Re:
Re = k
(
1− q
q
)
(8)
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Figure 3: (a) Contour map of Re with respect to k and q from formula (8). (b) The weekly cumulative fraction
of reported cases that are traced contacts, q˜(t), converges to approximately (or to exactly) the quantity q given
in formula (7).
Thus, Re can be formulated simply as the product of the number of infected traced contacts
per (untraced) reported case and the odds that a reported case is not a traced contact in the
case of perfect tracing. Notice that this formula is composed of two quantities that can be
determined by case data and contact tracing records.
The intuition behind the formula for Re is clear in the case where 100% of the cases are
reported. Indeed, consider a reported case which has caused k+m secondary infections, where
k of these are traced (consistent with notation) and m are untraced. Note that this reported case
is necessarily untraced since we are assuming that traced individuals are perfectly prevented
from causing further infection. If this reported case represents an average infectious individual
in the population and the level of contact tracing here represents the average in the population,
then the effective reproduction number Re should be m since this is the number secondary
infections which can cause further transmissions. Utilizing the formula (8) applied to this
transmission chain, we correctly find
Re = k
(
1− q
q
)
= k
(
m/(k +m)
k/(k +m)
)
= m (9)
The somewhat surprising result is that formula (8) still holds with an arbitrary proportion of
cases reported and distinct infectious periods for reported and unreported cases. Thus contact
tracing observables can theoretically provide an exact measure of Re even in the presence of
underreporting (ρ < 1) and distinct infectious periods (Th ≤ Tu). Our simple explanation
utilizing the single index case and single level of transmission chain above will not suffice in the
case of ρ < 1 since we can add unreported cases which would not appear in the calculation (9),
but should appear in Re. However, a simple intuitive line of reasoning is that underreporting
will cause cases to not be counted in individual transmission chains, but will also add to the total
reported cases since additional reported cases that are transmissions of unreported cases will
appear, thus balancing out the effect of underreporting. A more complete heuristic argument of
this result with transmission chains probably requires multiple levels and multiple index cases
of an outbreak transmission tree. Of course, considering explicit transmission trees more in
depth leads to thinking about contact tracing on networks, which is a subject in itself. We
leave this as ongoing and future research, and provide further discussion about extending our
work to networks in Section 4.
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In order to quantify the impact of control measures on reduction in reproduction number,
we can calculate the relative change in reproduction number after applying the intervention.
DefineRoe as the effective reproduction number when there is only case reporting/hospitalization
independent of contact tracing (e.g. passive case finding [44]) and no contact tracing. Thus
Roe = R0
(
ρTh
Tu
+ 1− ρ
)
. The relative changes in reproduction number with respect to the
distinct interventions, passive case finding and contact tracing, are as follows:
relative change in Re with tracing = R
o
e −Re
Roe
=
ρq
1− q(1− ρ) ,
relative change in R0 with only passive case finding = R0 −R
o
e
R0 = ρ
(
1− Th
Tu
)
, (10)
relative change in R0 with passive case finding & tracing = R0 −ReR0 = ρ
[
1− Th
Tu
(1− q)
1− q(1− ρ)
]
With these formulas, we can quantify the impact of contact tracing and compare with the
strategy of only passive case finding. Notice that the particular role of contact tracing in re-
ducing the effective reproduction number increases with q. Thus q provides a simple observable
measure of the impact of tracing, however the relative change in Re also depends on fraction
of cases reported independent of tracing, ρ.
Next, we consider another special case, in particular the assumption of perfect tracing is
relaxed. Suppose that there is perfect reporting and tracking, but imperfect monitoring, i.e.
ρ = pe = 1, βm > 0. In this case of 100% reporting, the reproduction number in the absence
of contact tracing is simply βTh, which we denote by R := βS0Th. In addition, define the
reproduction number of contact traced (monitored) individuals as Rm = βmS0Tm. Then θ =
Rm/R represents the reduction in secondary cases of a traced individual compared to an
untraced individual. As in the previous case, Re reduces to a simple formula:
Re = (1− φ)R+ φRm
Thus, in this instance, the critical proportion of total cases which need to be traced in order to
bring Re below one is:
Re = 1⇔ φc = (1− θ)
(
1− 1R
)
.
In order to describeRe in terms of contact tracing observables for this case, define k = φR and
km = φRm to be the average number of traced infected secondary cases caused per primary
reported untraced infected and traced infected, respectively. In the case of 100% reporting
(and pe = 1), ρ = 1, it is not hard to show that the fraction of reported cases which are traced
contacts, q, is simply q = φ. Thus, we find that
Re = k
(
1− q
q
)
+ km (12)
The impact of tracing in this case can simply be quantified, since the effective reproduction
number without tracing is Roe = R. The relative change in Re with tracing is:
Roe −Re
Roe
= q(1− θ) (13)
Together formulas (12) and (13) quantify both Re and the particular impact of contact tracing
on Re for a given tracing/monitoring efficacy (in terms of secondary case reduction θ due to
tracing) in the case of 100% reporting.
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3.2. Weekly point estimates of Re for Sierra Leone and Guinea
The results in the previous section suggest that the effective reproduction number, Re, can
be estimated directly from contact tracing and reported case data via simple formulas derived
from special cases of our mechanistic model of contact tracing. In this section, we will apply
formulas (8) and (12) to recent contact tracing and reported case data from the Ebola outbreak
in Sierra Leone and Guinea in order to obtain some weekly point estimates of Re for these two
countries under the assumption of the special cases discussed in the previous section, and in
particular different tracing efficacies. Then, we calculate the effective reproduction number
without contact tracing, Roe, in order to gauge the potential impact of contact tracing on the
epidemic. First, we briefly compare some other methods of estimating the effective reproduction
number in outbreaks from the literature.
A common method for estimating the reproduction number is to fit a deterministic model
to incidence data in order to infer unknown parameters in the underlying model and then
calculate the reproduction number from standard techniques (e.g. next-generation method)
[34, 5, 13, 35, 33]. Drawbacks to this approach are the lack of generality, context-specific
assumptions, potential identifiability issues along with the fact that parameters vary throughout
the epidemic [14, 43]. More recent statistical approaches based on the work of Wallinga and
Teunis [40] utilize case incidence data and knowledge of the distribution of the serial interval to
estimate time-varying values of Re throughout an epidemic [7, 14]. These statistical methods
are more generic in the sense that the underlying model is an infection network, however their
implementation can be complex and requires prior estimates of serial interval distribution.
We propose a novel method for estimating up to date values of Re based on contact tracing
and reported case observables by utilizing formulas (8) or (12). In particular, with reported
case data and contact tracing records detailing, both, the traced infected individuals and their
infector, we can directly utilize these formulas for calculation of Re (which hold under the
different simplifying assumptions of the previous section). Indeed, suppose we have the reported
case count at a particular time point t (cumulative reported cases during time window t − a
to t), information about whether these cases are known traced contacts, along with records
discerning the number of traced infected contacts which are derived from these reported cases.
Then the number of traced infected identified per untraced and traced reported case, k and
km, can be calculated at this time t. Furthermore, the fraction of reported cases which are
traced contacts, q, can be calculated for the subsequent time windows of reporting for these
traced contacts derived from the infecting reported cases at time t. Then, the formula (12),
Re = k(1 − q)/q + km, can be utilized with an appropriate averaging technique to estimate
the effective reproduction number, Re, at time t. Thus, with a time-series of this case/tracing
data, the corresponding point estimates of Re can be calculated in this way for each feasible
time point in the series.
In comparison with the other methods, our proposed procedure is similar to the statistical
approach first described by Wallinga and Teunis [40], however, our approach shows a potential
way to, both, incorporate specific contact tracing data and remove the need for utilizing (and
estimating) the serial interval distribution. We remark that Cauchemez et al. utilize contact
tracing data in order to infer the serial interval and use this to “reconstruct tracing information
for untraced cases” assuming perfect reporting [7]. Our work suggests that contact tracing
and reported case data, by themselves, may be sufficient to estimate Re based on formula
(12). Also, since our formulas are derived from a mechanistic differential equation model,
we provide a bridge between compartmental deterministic models and the statistical methods
based on reconstructing an infection network. With our general detailed model of contact
tracing in the background, we can explore the effect of relaxing simplifying assumptions about
the tracing process. In addition, the formulas (10) and (13) provide a fresh perspective on
13
Time (week leading up to date)
Jan. 11 Jan. 18 Jan. 25 Feb. 1 Feb. 8 Feb. 15 Feb. 22 Mar. 1 Mar. 8 Mar. 15 Mar. 22 Mar. 29 Apr. 5 Apr.12
T
r
a
c
e
d
&
R
e
p
o
r
t
e
d
C
a
s
e
s
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
Reported (traced)
Reported (untraced)
(a)
Time (week leading up to date)
Jan. 18 Jan. 25 Feb. 1 Feb. 8 Feb. 15 Feb. 22 Mar. 1 Mar. 8 Mar. 15 Mar. 22 Mar. 29 Apr. 5 Apr.12
T
r
a
c
e
d
&
R
e
p
o
r
t
e
d
C
a
s
e
s
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
Reported (traced)
Reported (untraced)
(b)
Time (Week leading up to date)
Jan. 11 Jan. 18 Jan. 25 Feb. 1 Feb. 8 Feb. 15 Feb. 22 Mar. 1 Mar. 8 Mar. 15 Mar. 22 Mar. 29 Apr. 5 Apr. 12
q
(
T
r
a
c
e
d
÷
R
e
p
o
r
t
e
d
)
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
(c)
Time (Week leading up to date)
Jan. 18 Jan. 25 Feb. 1 Feb. 8 Feb. 15 Feb. 22 Mar. 1 Mar. 8 Mar. 15 Mar. 22 Mar. 29 Apr. 5 Apr. 12
q
(
T
r
a
c
e
d
÷
R
e
p
o
r
t
e
d
)
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
(d)
Figure 4: WHO data of weekly reported and traced cases for Guinea (a) and Sierra Leone (b) for mid January
to mid April. The fraction of reported cases that are known traced contacts, q, is plotted versus week for Guinea
(c) and Sierra Leone (d). The data was obtained from weekly WHO situation reports ([1]).
real-time evaluation of efficacy of control measures, in particular contact tracing, which was a
problem considered in [7].
Recall that the formula was derived to hold with arbitrary underreporting (ρ ≤ 1) in the case
of perfect monitoring, km = 0, and hold for 100% reporting (ρ = 1) in the case of imperfect
monitoring, km > 0. It should be possible to obtain the k and km directly from contact tracing
data, however, we were not able to find such data, and we recommend public health officials
to keep and publicly share the necessary records for the estimation of average traced infected
contacts found per reported case. Despite this limitation of direct data, in a similar spirit to
the methods of Wallinga and Teunis [40], we utilize estimates of the serial interval distribution
for Ebola from previous works [11], in order to infer likely “averaged” infection networks, from
which values of k and km are obtained under different scenarios of tracing efficacy. In this way,
we calculate weekly point estimates of Re utilizing formula (12) with weekly case and tracing
data, along with incorporating previous estimates of the serial interval distribution of Ebola,
in order to evaluate the potential impact of contact tracing on the epidemic.
The WHO [1] has recently published weekly counts of traced individuals among reported
cases in Guinea and Sierra Leone as part of the weekly WHO situation reports (see Figure 4).
Recall, by (12), the effective reproduction number can be estimated as Re = k
(
1−q
q
)
+ km,
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where k and km are the infected traced contacts identified per untraced and traced reported
case, respectively. Define Cj and Tj as the cumulative reported cases and traced (reported)
cases in week j, respectively. The serial interval, which we denote by σ, is defined as the time
from illness onset in the primary case to illness onset in the secondary case [18]. The serial
interval of Ebola has been estimated to be a Weibull distribution (random variable denoted
W ) with scale and shape parameters estimated at 13.6 and 2.6, respectively [11]. Therefore,
we estimate the probabilities p1, p2, and p3 of the serial interval being ≤ 7 days, 7 − 14
days, and 14 − 21 days, as: p1 = P(W < 7) = 0.18, p2 = P(7 < W < 14) = 0.51, and
p3 = 1− p2− p1 = 0.31 ≈ P(14 < W < 21). Suppose that the tracing/monitoring reproduction
number reduction is 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1, i.e. Rm = θR. Then, the average number of traced infected
identified in week j + n per untraced and traced reported case from week j, kj,n and kj,nm , and
the fraction of reported cases that are traced in week j + n, qj+n, are:
kj,n =
Tj+n
Cj − (1− θ)Tj , k
j,n
m =
θTj+n
Cj − (1− θ)Tj , qj+n =
Tj+n
Cj+n
,
since kj,n(Cj − Tj) + kj,nm Tj = Tj+n and kj,nm = θkj,n.
Thus, we estimate the (expectation of) effective reproduction number of week j, E(R(j)e ), as:
E(R(j)e ) =
∑
n
P(n− j − 1 ≤ σ ≤ n− j weeks) · E(R(j)e | n− j − 1 ≤ σ ≤ n− j weeks)
=
∑
n
pn ·
(
kj,n
(
1− qj+n
qj+n
)
+ kj,nm
)
=
1
Cj − (1− θ)Tj
∑
n
pn (Cj+n − (1− θ)Tj+n) (14)
Therefore R(j)e is estimated as the ratio of the sum of untraced and a fraction θ of traced
reported cases, weighted (based on serial interval distribution) over the weeks following j, to
the sum of untraced and this fraction θ of traced reported cases during week j. In the case
of perfect tracing, θ = 0, only weekly untraced reported cases (Cn − Tn) are involved in the
calculation of Re. Conversely, in the case that tracing has no impact, θ = 1, all reported cases
(traced or untraced) are equally weighted in the calculation of Re, thus the specific tracing
data giving traced reported cases per week (Tn) is not utilized. We note that a more rigorous
maximum likelihood analysis can be developed with our approach similar to [40] and confidence
intervals can be generated for the weekly estimates ofRe. However, since we are more interested
in a relatively straightforward application of formula (12) to data and quantifying the potential
impact of contact tracing, we simply calculate the expected value of the weekly reproductive
number, R(j)e , by the law of total expectation.
In Figure 5(a) and 5(b), the weekly point estimates of Re for Guinea and Sierra Leone are
obtained using the formula (14) for different levels of tracing efficacy; reproduction number
proportion θ = 0 (perfect tracing), θ = 1/2, θ = 1 (no impact of tracing). Figure 5(a) and
5(b) shows the estimates of Re in the case θ = 1/2 alongside the weekly reported cases for
Guinea and Sierra Leone, respectively. Notice that, especially for Guinea, the reproduction
number Re fluctuates substantially about the epidemic threshold Re = 1 over the time period
depicted. These fluctuations coincide with changes in the weekly incidence curve with a delay
representative of the serial interval. For the Figures 5(a) and 5(b), one should keep in mind
that formula (14) is utilized to calculate Re, thus reported cases and the amount of traced
cases affect the values of Re. In comparison with Guinea, the estimates of Re for Sierra Leone
have a more decreasing trend with smaller values and less fluctuation, and this pattern also
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Figure 5: Weekly estimated values of Re ( E(R(j)e ) in (14) ) for both Guinea (a) and Sierra Leone (b) assuming
tracing reproduction number proportion θ = 0, i.e. perfect tracing (blue), θ = 0.5 (purple), and θ = 1 (orange).
In (c) and (d), estimates of Re assuming θ = 0.5 are shown alongside the weekly case count curve for Guinea
and Sierra Leone, respectively.
holds true in the reported case count. In addition, Figures 4(c), 4(d) show that the fraction
of traced cases, q, is larger for Sierra Leone. This suggests that contact tracing has been more
successful in Sierra Leone over the time period, as will be discussed below and further depicted
in Figure 6. Supporting this notion, delving deeper into the given data in Figures 4(c) and
4(d), we notice that the auto-correlation of the time-series of q for Guinea is more random
than that of Sierra Leone. Indeed, for Sierra Leone the data for q has larger auto-correlation
corresponding to time lags less than three weeks, which is expected based on the serial interval
of Ebola. This suggests that perhaps Sierra Leone has had a more constant tracing effort when
compared to Guinea, which may explain the different outcomes of the countries over this time
period. Further comparison of the countries’ responses and epidemics is an important topic
and will be studied in future work.
The reproduction number fluctuates more when assuming perfect tracing (θ = 0), as only the
untraced cases are assumed to cause secondary infections and the fraction of reported cases
that are traced contacts, q, is not fixed from week to week. Certainly the limited amount
of tracing data, combined with variability in q, may cause error in our calculation of Re.
In addition, recall the simplifying assumptions of either perfect tracing or perfect reporting
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under which formula (12) holds. Also, it is unclear how much of the variation in Re is due to
observation error or underlying stochasticity in the transmission process versus actual changes in
reproduction number (transmission potential). The success of formula (12) in finding the “true”
expected value of the (possibly time-varying) effective reproduction number Re will be explored
in future work with simulated data. Also, as mentioned previously, a major limitation is our
implicit inference of the parameter k and km based on the estimated serial interval distribution.
Despite the limitations, our main goal in this section is to illustrate the potential value in
utilizing contact tracing observables to estimate Re through formula (12). We emphasize that
our general approach for calculating Re with can avoid the need to utilize a serial interval
distribution. Instead, contact tracing observables can be directly used to calculate k and km in
the formula (12) if the detailed tracing records are available.
Our methodology can quantify the impact of contact tracing and case hospitalization indepen-
dent of tracing (passive case finding) in reducing the reproduction number utilizing formulas
(10) and (13). In particular, under the assumption of perfect tracing (θ = 0), for given level
of reporting of untraced cases (fraction ρ), the effective reproduction number without contact
tracing, Roe, can be calculated with the weekly estimates of Re, the data for fraction of reported
cases that are traced contacts (q), and formula (10). In Figures 6(c) and 6(d), Roe is plotted
above Re for two different levels of reporting untraced cases, 75% and 100%, for both Guinea
and Sierra Leone. We also consider impact of contact tracing in the case of imperfect trac-
ing (and 100 % reporting), namely for tracing specific reproduction number reduction of 50%
(θ = 0.5) in Figures 6(a) and 6(b). From the estimates of Re and data for q, we also determine
the reproduction number, R0, without contact tracing or any case hospitalization given values
of ρ and Th/Tu in the case of perfect tracing. Figures 6(e) and 6(f), compare weekly values of
Re with Roe and R0 for ρ = 0.75 and ρ = 1 (assuming Th = 4 and Tu = 9.8). Thus we can
utilize formulas (8), (12), (10) and (13) with contact tracing observables in order to determine
the reduction in reproduction number due to contact tracing and passive case finding, which
allows for evaluating the effectiveness of these different interventions.
These figures illustrate that contact tracing in both countries had an impact on Re from
January to the middle of March, but the impact has been much more dramatic in Sierra
Leone. Indeed, even when assuming 50% efficacy of contact tracing/monitoring (θ = 0.5), our
calculations show that contact tracing has pushed the average effective reproduction number
over this time period below one in Sierra Leone. Our results indicate that contact tracing efforts
may need to be increased in Guinea in order to ensure epidemic control and to reduce the risk
from unknown chains of transmission. The target goal of WHO is “for 100% of new cases to
arise among registered contacts, so that each and every chain of transmission can be tracked
and terminated”. While this is certainly an ideal target, it is important to at least reduce and
stabilize Re substantially below one in order to control the epidemic with limited resources and
end the outbreak in a timely manner.
3.3. Impact of contact tracing and control on disease dynamics in general model
In order to investigate the coupled effects of contact tracing, case reporting and disease char-
acteristics on epidemic spread, we analyze the general model (6). In particular, variable tracing
responsiveness and monitoring protocols, along with public health campaigns independent of
contact tracing, are evaluated according to their impact on the effective reproduction number
Re and cumulative case count. In addition, computation of Re in this general setting helps to
quantify potential underestimation of Re in formulas derived in Section 3.1 for the simplifying
cases of “perfect” tracing speed (pe = 1), and either perfect monitoring efficacy (βm = 0) or
perfect reporting (ρ = 1).
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Figure 6: Impact of contact tracing : Weekly estimated values ofRoe (red) (reproduction number without tracing,
calculated using (10) and (13) ) are plotted above the estimated values of Re for both Guinea (a,c,e) and Sierra
Leone (b,d,f) assuming traced contact reproduction number reduction θ = 0.5 (a,b) (purple) and ρ = 1; and
perfect tracing, i.e. θ = 0 (c-f) (blue), for two different levels of reporting of untraced cases, 75% (green) and
100% (red). In (e) and (f), the basic reproduction number, R0, without any case hospitalization is also displayed
assuming Th = 4 and Tu = 9.8.
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Figure 7: (a) Contour map of Re when varying time until hospitalization/reporting (Th) and proportion of
reported case contacts that are traced (φ) in the special case of perfect monitoring (βm = 0). Note that for
the other parameters, we set: β = 0.4/N where N = 6× 106 (population of Sierra Leone), infectious period for
unreported infected Tu = 9.8, proportion of untraced infected hospitalized ρ = 0.75, incubation period τ = 10
and tracking delay δ = 2. Note pe, p
e
e, p
i
e, Ti are given by formulas derived earlier. (b) The effect of varying βm
(monitoring efficacy) and φ. Note that Tm = 2 and all other parameters are as in (a).
The effective reproduction number Re can be reduced by both contact tracing and public
campaigns aimed at increasing case hospitalization and decreasing time until hospitalization
among untraced individuals (passive case finding). Considering both types of control strategies
together, we find that passive case finding has a synergistic effect on the efficacy of contact
tracing and reduction of Re. In particular, Figure 7(a) shows that reduction in time until
hospitalization (independent of tracing), Th, has a nonlinear impact on the proportion of re-
ported case contacts that are traced, φ, required to bring Re below one. Indeed, reducing Th
has the effect of both decreasing the reproduction number and number of contacts of untraced
individuals and increasing the efficacy of tracing through improvements in tracing speed (pe is
increased, Ti is decreased). In the Appendix D, Figure 1(a) illustrates a similar synergistic
effect observed for increasing case hospitalization/reporting, ρ.
Consideration of the details of the contact tracing process leads to questions about how distinct
tracing and monitoring parameters affect the disease dynamics. We explore how the extent of
contact tracing (through proportion of reported case contacts that are traced, φ), strictness of
monitoring protocol (transmission rate of traced contacts, βm) and delay between index case
reporting to tracing (δ), affect Re (Figure 7(b), 1(b)) in Appendix D). We generally find
that contact tracing more individuals has a larger impact then the strictness of monitoring
and tracing speed. Indeed, increasing the fraction of contacts traced, φ, is a more “upstream”
intervention and the relatively long mean incubation period τ (≈ 10 days) of Ebola allows
for more time to track contacts. This long incubation period, combined with the fact that
infectiousness and symptoms onset are coincidental and transmission occurs only through direct
contact, are disease traits which make Ebola particularly amenable to contact tracing. Our
observations are corroborated in a global sensitivity analysis of Re with respect to the model
parameters (Figure D.2 in Appendix D). Overall, this sensitivity analysis suggests that the
proportion of (untraced) cases hospitalized/reported, ρ, has the largest impact on Re, followed
by time until hospitalization (independent of tracing) Th, transmission rate β and proportion
of reported case contacts traced φ.
In addition to the effect on Re, we investigate the impact of parameters and various control
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Figure 8: (a) Simulations of cumulative reported and total cases before and after contact tracing/enhanced
control measures. The before represents the initial exponential increase of the epidemic in Sierra Leone with data
fit by model using parameters β = 0.4/N (as above), ρ = 0.5, yielding Re = 2. After the vertical dashed line (48
days from t = 0) shows the trajectory of reported (solid) and total (dashed) cumulative cases for four different
scenarios: no control (Re = 2); Th = 5, ρ = 0.75 (Re = 1.0068);Th = 5, ρ = 0.95 (Re = 0.7531);Th = 3, ρ = 0.75
(Re = 0.8679). Also βm = 0.5β, ρ = 0.75, δ = 2, Tm = 2 and τ = 10. Note that actual cumulative reported
cases for Sierra Leone is ≈ 9, 500 at end time of simulations ( Dec. 31). (b) Cumulative weekly reported
and traced cases for the scenarios in (a). (c) Weekly fraction of reported cases which are traced contacts (d)
Cumulative total, reported and traced at day 215 for the three scenarios in (a) when tracing (and enhanced
control) begins at day 24, 48 and 72.
scenarios on the cumulative case count in the model (6). Assuming an initial reproduction
number of Re = 2 (with Th = 5, Tu = 9.8, ρ = 0.5) for the 48 days between May 27 and
July 14 (a reasonable fit for the initial exponential epidemic growth in Sierra Leone [11, 36]),
we simulate forward the cumulative cases under different control scenarios in Figure 8. The
simulations show that minimizing effective reproduction number Re does not always align with
minimal cumulative cases over a time period (or over the entire epidemic; example shown in
SI). In particular, reducing time until hospitalization to Th = 3 with contact tracing proportion
φ = 0.75 has a larger impact on cumulative cases over the time period t = 48 to t = 210
than the case when Th = 5, φ = 0.95, even though the respective Re values have opposite
ordering. Also, the number of traced reported cases for the first scenario (Th = 3, φ = 0.75)
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is substantially less than the other scenario (Th = 5, φ = 0.95), which may be important given
limited contact tracing resources. While our model does not explicitly account for tracing
susceptible individuals, the number of total traced individuals can be thought of as proportional
to the number of traced infected with proportionality constant 1/p where p is the probability
of transmission per contact. Simulations show that timing of the control measures are crucial
in reducing both cumulative cases and the number of contacts which need to be traced (Figure
8(d)). Global sensitivity analysis of total cumulative cases at t = 148 is similar to the sensitivity
analysis of Re, except that φ has slightly less impact, and the tracing delay δ and incubation
period τ (both of which affect the probability of reaching an infected contact during incubation
period, pe) gain more importance. Summarizing the results, we find that passive case finding
along with contact tracing, and early initiation of the interventions are key components in
controlling an Ebola epidemic under the constraint of limited resources.
To conclude this section, we remark upon how the simple formulas derived for Re under
the assumption of “perfect” tracing or perfect reporting differ from the more general case.
Clearly the case of “perfect” tracing (βm = 0, pe = 1) results in lower values of Re than in
the imperfect setting of βm > 0, pe < 1. However, as shown in Figure 7(b), the simplification
of perfect tracing does not lead to substantially lower values of Re than the imperfect case,
especially in the general case of “perfect monitoring” (βm = 0, pe ≤ 1). A more interesting
question to explore is the following: how well does the formula in terms of tracing observables,
Re = k(1 − q)/q + km (where k and km is # of infected traced per reported untraced and
traced case, respectively, and q is fraction of reported cases that are traced), hold in the general
setting? In Figure 8(c), it is shown that the weekly fraction of reported cases that are traced,
q(t), converges to a constant value for each scenario. Thus, a constant value q seems to be
possible to define more generally, but this quantity, along with k and km, may be difficult to
formulate in a simple expression of model parameters. It is conceivable that such a formula can
hold in general by a similar heuristic argument for the formula holding with underreporting
given in Section 3.1 for the case of perfect tracing. Indeed, while imperfect reporting and
tracing lead to “missing cases” in individual transmission chains of an index reported case,
more reported cases are generated throughout the network, potentially balancing out the effect
of imperfect reporting and tracing.
4. Discussion
During the 2014-2015 West Africa Ebola epidemic, it was clear that control measures were
insufficient as the number of cases grew rapidly, but ultimately improvements in individual
behavior, community engagement, early case isolation and safe burials have slowed down the
disease trajectory. To have the best chance of averting another epidemic of Ebola or another
emergent pathogen, it is important to know which particular interventions were most responsible
for reversing the momentum. In this study, we focus on analyzing the effectiveness of contact
tracing along with passive case finding for the West Africa Ebola outbreak and other potential
epidemics in the future.
We have developed a mechanistic differential equation model of the contact tracing process
in an infectious disease outbreak, particularly relevant to Ebola outbreaks. It is widely rec-
ognized that contact tracing is an integral component of Ebola interventions [1]. Our deter-
ministic model explicitly links contact tracing to reported case transmissions, and incorporates
the coupled effects of disease traits, passive case finding (independent of tracing) and trac-
ing/monitoring efforts. The novel framework of the model is separating infectious cases that
will be reported, further separating a fraction of their transmissions which will be traced and
determining the action of tracers based on infectious stage of the traced contact. This captures
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the dynamic structure of contact tracing.
The explicit linking to transmission in our model brings out an interesting connection between
observable contact tracing data and the effective reproduction Re, yielding novel formulas for
real-time estimates of Re. We show that under the assumption of perfect tracking, along with
either perfect monitoring of traced contacts or perfect reporting of all cases,Re = k(1−q)/q+km
where k and km are the average number of secondary infected individuals traced per primary
reported untraced and trace case, respectively, and (1− q)/q is the odds that a reported cases
is not a traced contact. This formula (8) can provide simple current estimates of Re in the
population, as illustrated utilizing a limited dataset of weekly reported and traced Ebola cases
in Guinea and Sierra Leone from mid January to April 2015. Our results indicate that contact
tracing has likely been important in calming the epidemic for Sierra Leone over this time period,
but had less impact on the disease dynamics in Guinea. Increasing contact tracing effort and
efficacy has the potential to eliminate the disease at this later stage in the outbreak. The
relative contribution of contact tracing in influencing the value of Re is increasing with q, the
fraction of reported cases that are traced contacts, and Re → km as q → 1. Therefore, the goal
that WHO has set forth to bring the fraction of traced reported q to one in order to “eliminate
all unknown transmission chains” is indicative of utilizing contact tracing to end the epidemic.
There is less applicable data on contact tracing in 2014 when the Ebola outbreak was at a
more critical stage in West Africa, and there are more questions about the efficacy of tracing
during times of intense transmission as contact tracers may have been overwhelmed with high
volumes of contacts to trace [3]. While further investigation into the efficacy of contact tracing
in West Africa throughout the epidemic utilizing all data sources is needed, this is beyond
the scope of our current work. However, we can utilize our sensitivity analysis and model
simulations to gain insight on the impact and optimal deployment of contact tracing during
different stages in the outbreak. First, our study suggests that a combination of interventions
can work synergistically, which may help to alleviate logistical problems with contact tracing
in high transmission areas. In particular, improvements in passive case finding (faster and
more frequent isolation independent of contact tracing) together with contact tracing are most
efficient in reducing incidence. In this case, even with limited resources, contact tracing can
play an important role in controlling hot zones.
Contact tracing is a multi-faceted strategy with multiple ways of impacting disease dynamics
and distinct operational variables to consider. For instance, tracking the contacts and notify-
ing/educating them about their status can reduce their secondary transmission if they develop
symptoms, even if they are not isolated right away. Our model includes the details of the
contact tracing process along with quantifying their relative contribution to the overall efficacy
of the intervention. We find that the fraction of (high-risk) contacts traced per reported case
is more important than delays in tracking (since the incubation period of Ebola is relatively
long) and potentially the strictness of monitoring protocol (assuming their transmission and
time to isolation is reduced enough). Optimizing the allocation of resources to tracing more
individuals can possibly be achieved, for example, by checking up on traced contacts less often,
but establishing trust and educating on the first visit to reduce the risk of that contact trans-
mitting the disease. Another finding from simulations of our model is the dramatic difference
that earlier intervention can make when applied before the number of cases is high. Contact
tracing effectively at the beginning of an epidemic substantially reduces cumulative cases and
overall need of resources. Certainly, it also vastly increases the probability of ending an out-
break rapidly, as in the case of Nigeria and Senegal in 2014. Finally, contact tracing data can
be utilized to evaluate the overall epidemic status and efficacy of interventions in real time in
order to adjust efforts to the current situation.
There are several limitations to our model, along with promising directions for future work.
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As mentioned in the previous paragraphs, limited resources in the face of an inflating epidemic
can severely restrict the impact of contact tracing. Although our results shed light on how to
alleviate this problem through passive case finding or adjusting monitoring protocols, it may
be informative to explicitly incorporate tracing logistics in the model. Another future line
of research will be to investigate whether formulas relating reproduction number to contact
tracing observables, such as Re = k(1− q)/q + km, can be derived for contact networks, along
with more generally extending our model to networks. In addition, further work will involve
evaluating the accuracy of these formulas through simulated data from stochastic versions of
the model. Also, other disease distributions, e.g. gamma-distributed incubation and infectious
period, can be utilized to better match real data and generalize our approach. Our work
establishes a theoretical framework to build upon for the mechanistic modeling of contact
tracing and utilizing contact tracing observables to obtain simple real-time estimates of effective
reproduction number, along with evaluating the impact of control strategies on an epidemic.
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Appendix A. Calculation of effective reproduction number Re
The effective reproduction number Re can be defined utilizing the next-generation approach
[39]. First define the feasible region for the system (6) as
Γ =
{
x = (S,E,Eec , E
i
c, Ih, Iu, I
e
c , I
i
c)
T ∈ R8+ | N :=
8∑
i=1
xi ≤ N0
}
,
where R8+ denotes the non-negative orthant of R8 and N0 is the initial total population size (of
all compartments). We note that the system (6) is quasi-positive, and thus its solutions remain
non-negative when their initial values are nonnegative. Summing the right-hand sides of (6),
we find that N ′(t) ≤ −γ (Ih(t) + Iu(t) + Iec (t) + I ic(t)) ≤ 0 for a positive constant γ. Thus the
solutions the system (6) remain in Γ when their initial values are in Γ. Notice that for initial
susceptible population, S0, E0 := (S0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0)T is disease-free equilibrium of system (6).
We define a next-generation matrix by considering the linearized system at the disease-free
equilibrium, E0. Write the linearized “infection” sub-system as y′ = (F − V )y, where F
contains entries corresponding to new infections, and −V contains all other transition terms in
the Jacobian matrix evaluated at E0. Thus, we consider the following matrices:
F = S0

0 0 0 (1− φ)β β (1− φ)βm (1− φ)β
0 0 0 peφβ 0 p
e
eφβm p
i
eφβ
0 0 0 (1− pe)φβ 0 (1− pee)φβm (1− pie)φβ
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0

,
23
V =

1
τ
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1
τ
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1
τ
0 0 0 0
−ρ 1
τ
0 0 1/Th 0 0 0
−(1− ρ) 1
τ
0 0 0 1/Tu 0 0
0 − 1
τ
0 0 0 1/Tm 0
0 0 − 1
τ
0 0 0 1/Ti

.
The next-generation matrix describing expected number of new infections (by the different types
of infectious cases) is then defined as K := FV −1 [39]. The effective reproduction number, Re,
is the spectral radius of K, %(K):
Re = %(K) = %(FV −1)
Appendix A.1. Calculation of Ti (5)
For individuals in the I ic compartment, the average infectious period (prior to being tracked),
Ti, can be approximated by considering the expected value of the time after symptom onset
when a traced contact is tracked (given that they have progressed past their incubation period
upon tracking), Tˆi. The formula for Tˆi in the calculation of Ti (5) is derived as follows:
Tˆi = Th + δ − E ( length of incubation period X | infectious at tracking time)
= Th + δ − 1
Th
∫ Th
0
E ( X | infected at time r ∈ [0, Th] and X ∈ [r, Th + δ] ) dr
=
1
Th
∫ Th
0
[
Th + δ −
(∫ Th+δ
r
xe−(x−r)/τ∫ Th−r+δ
0 e
−s/τ ds
dx
)]
dr
Here the notation E (X|A) denotes the expected value of random variable X given information
A. Note that the compartment I ic includes both individuals that are tracked when infectious and
those that are tracked after infectiousness (removed by recovery, death or reporting independent
of tracing). We also remark that clearly the waiting times corresponding to infectious period
independent of tracing (with mean approximated by T¯ ) and contact tracking of infectious (with
mean approximated by Tˆi) are independent. Thus it is reasonable to treat the corresponding
processes as independent exponentially distributed, and therefore to consider the sum of the rates
in formula (5). Also, note that Tˆi can more accurately be calculated by also integrating over
the index case infectious period probability distribution as with the calculation of pe, however
to simplify, we assume a fixed infectious period Th for the index reported case.
Appendix B. Formulae for Re in special cases
For the special cases of the model considered in Section 3.1, consider the scenario in which
traced individuals are always tracked during their incubation phase, i.e. pe = 1. Then, we can
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reduce the general system (6) to the following system:
S ′ = −βS(Ih + Iu)− βmSIc
E ′ = βSIu + (1− φ) βSIh + (1− φ) βmSIc − 1
τ
E
I ′h =
ρ
τ
E − 1
Th
Ih
I ′u =
1− ρ
τ
E − 1
Tu
Iu
(Ec)
′ = φβSIh + φβmSIc − 1
τ
Ec
(Ic)
′ =
1
τ
Ec − 1
Tm
Ic (A2)
Here Ec(t) and Ic(t) are the exposed individuals who are contact traced (necessarily in their
incubation phase since pe = 1) and infectious contact traced (monitored) individuals, respec-
tively.
First, consider the scenario of “perfect tracing”, i.e. the case of perfect monitoring (βm = 0).
In this case, since βm = 0, the traced individuals do not transmit the infection, thus Ec and Ic
compartments are decoupled from the first four equations in system (A2). Either by inserting
βm = 0 and pe = 1 into the F matrix in the next-generation decomposition for the general
model or calculating Re in the reduced model (A2) with βm = 0, we find:
Re = R0
(
ρ
Th
Tu
(1− φ) + 1− ρ
)
, (A3)
where R0 = βS0Tu.
Consider 1
Tm
∫ t
t−a Ic(s)ds and
1
Th
∫ t
t−a Ih(s)ds, the cumulative number of reported contact traced
cases and reported cases independent from contact tracing, respectively, from time t − a to t.
Define the fraction of reported cases that are traced contact (from time t− a to t):
q˜a(t) =
1
Tm
∫ t
t−a Ic(s)ds
1
Tm
∫ t
t−a Ic(s)ds+
1
Th
∫ t
t−a Ih(s)ds
.
In addition, define the following constant q:
q =
φ
φ+ (1− φ)ρ+ (1− ρ)Tu
Th
.
As mentioned in Section 3.1, q can be interpreted as the conditional probability that a transmis-
sion is traced given that this case is reported. Indeed, the probability that a case (transmission)
is reported can be expressed as the sum of the probabilities of the three mutually exclusive
events that the transmission was caused by a traced reported case, untraced reported case, and
unreported case. These probabilities are the summands in the denominator (multiplied by ρ)
of q.
Proposition 1. For sufficiently small a and sufficiently large time t,
q˜a(t) ≈ q.
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Proof 1. Note that
q˜a(t) =
1
τ
∫ t
t−aEc(s)ds− Ic(t) + Ic(t− a)
1
τ
∫ t
t−aEc(s)ds− Ic(t) + Ic(t− a) + ρτ
∫ t
t−aE(s)ds− Ih(t) + Ih(t− a)
=
∫ t
t−a φβS(s)Ih(s)ds+ ψC(t)∫ t
t−a φβS(s)Ih(s)ds+ ψC(t) + ρ
∫ t
t−a (βS(s)Iu(s) + (1− φ)βS(s)Ih(s))ds+ ψ(t)
=
φ
∫ t
t−a βS(s)Ih(s)ds+ ψC(t)
(φ+ ρ(1− φ)) ∫ t
t−a βS(s)Ih(s)ds+ ρ
∫ t
t−a βS(s)Iu(s)ds+ ψ(t) + ψC(t)
,
where ψ(t) = Ih(t−a)−Ih(t)+E(t−a)−E(t−a) and ψC(t) = Ic(t−a)−Ic(t)+Ec(t−a)−Ec(t−a).
Moreover ∫ t
t−a
(ρI ′u − (1− ρ)I ′h)ds =
∫ t
t−a
(
1− ρ
Th
Ih − ρ
Tu
Iu)ds.
Then we obtain the following equality:
Tuρ(Iu(t)− Iu(t− a)) + (1− ρ)(Ih(t− a)− Ih(t)) =
∫ t
t−a
(1− ρ)Tu
Th
Ih(s)ds−
∫ t
t−a
ρIu(s)ds.
Let define θ(t) = Tuρ(Iu(t)− Iu(t− a)) + (1− ρ)(Ih(t− a)− Ih(t)).
For small enough a, we can assume S(t) is constant over the interval [t− a, t]. Then
q˜(t) =
βSφ
∫ t
t−a Ih(s)ds+ ψC(t)
βS(φ+ ρ(1− φ)) ∫ t
t−a Ih(s)ds+ βS(1− ρ)TuTh
∫ t
t−a Ih(s)ds+ ψ(t) + ψC(t)− θ(t)
As in other outbreak models, it can be shown that the infection components converge to zero as
t→∞. Thus ψ(t), ψC(t), θ(t) ≈ 0, when t is sufficiently large. Then for sufficiently large t, we
obtain
q˜a(t) ≈ φ
φ+ (1− φ)ρ+ (1− ρ)Tu
Th
= q.
Thus inserting q and k = βS0Thφ into (A3), we find the following formula for the effective
reproduction number Re:
Re = β (ρTh(1− φ) + (1− ρ)Tu)
=
k
φ
(ρ(1− φ) + 1− ρ)
= k
(
1− q
q
)
.
Next, consider the case of imperfect tracing (monitoring), βm > 0, but perfect reporting,
ρ = 1. As in the previous case, Re reduces to a simple formula:
Re = (1− φ)R+ φRm,
where R := βS0Th and Rm = βmS0Tm. In this case, it is not hard to see that q = φ and we can
similarly prove that q˜a(t) ≈ q for large enough t and small enough a. Then, with km = Rmφ,
we have
Re = k
(
1− q
q
)
+ km.
26
Appendix C. Base SEIR models
Base model with single infectious compartment:
S ′(t) = −βS(t)I(t)
E ′(t) = βS(t)I(t)− 1
τ
E(t)
I ′(t) =
1
τ
E(t)− 1
T
I(t) (B1)
H ′(t) =
ρ
T
I(t)
Proposition 2. The two base models (1) and (B1) are equivalent if Th = Tu = T and Ih(0) =
ρI(0), Iu(0) = (1− ρ)I(0). In addition, the reproduction number of (B1) is R0 = βT , thus the
reproduction number of models (1) and (B1) are equal in general when T = ρTh + (1− ρ)Tu.
Proof 2. For the solution to (1), define Iˆ(t) = Ih(t) + Iu(t). Then Iˆ
′(t) = 1
τ
E(t)− 1
T
Iˆ(t) and
Iˆ(0) = Ih(0) + Iu(0) = I(0). Noting that the compartment H is decoupled in both systems,
we can conclude that (S(t), E(t), Iˆ(t)) = (S(t), E(t), I(t)), where I(t) is the infectious solution
to (B1). Notice that (ρIˆ)′ = ρ
τ
E − 1
T
(ρIˆ) and (ρIˆ)(0) = Ih(0). Thus Ih(t) = ρIˆ(t) = ρI(t).
Therefore, we also find that H ′(t) = 1
T
Ih(t) =
ρ
T
Iˆ(t) = ρ
T
I(t). This shows models (1) and (B1)
are equivalent if Th = Tu = T and Ih(0) = ρI(0), Iu(0) = (1− ρ)I(0). The second statement is
immediate.
Note that numerical simulations show that the final size of the epidemics match for solutions
to models (1) and (B1) when the reproduction numbers are equal, i.e. T = ρTh + (1 − ρ)Tu
and β is the same. In addition, numerics show that if Th ≈ Tu, then the transient behavior of
solutions of the two models (I(t) and Ih(t) + Iu(t) are almost identical, however as |Th − Tu|
increases, the transient dynamics become more distinct even though the final sizes will match.
Appendix D. Additional Sensitivity Analysis Figures
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Figure D.1: Surface of effective reproduction number, Re, for general model (6) when varying (a) ρ and φ, (b)
δ and τ . The parameters are as in Figure 7(a) with Th = 3 and φ = ρ = 0.75 in (b).
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Figure D.2: (a) Global sensitivity analysis of Re with respect to parameters using Latin Hypercube Sampling
(LHS) and Partial-Rank Correlation Coefficients (PRCC). (a) Sensitivity analysis of cumulative total cases with
respect to parameters using LHS and PRCC.
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